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Abstract 
We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive 
debt contracts.  These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower's 
performance deteriorates or improves, thereby increasing expected costs of financial distress 
while making a firm riskier to the benefit of option holders.  We find that managers whose 
compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility choose steeper and more convex performance 
pricing schedules, while those with high delta incentives choose flatter, less convex pricing 
schedules.  Performance pricing contracts therefore seem to provide a channel for managers to 
increase firms’ financial risk to gain private benefits. 
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I. Introduction 
Performance pricing in commercial debt contracts links the borrower’s interest payments 
to a measure of financial performance, such as its current credit rating or balance sheet ratios.  A 
typical performance sensitive debt (PSD) contract charges lower interest rates in times of good 
performance and higher interest during poor performance. 
Some practitioners caution that performance pricing may exacerbate the costs of financial 
distress.1  Consistent with these concerns, Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2009) demonstrate 
that in a setting with bankruptcy costs and tax benefits, PSD obligations are less efficient than 
fixed-rate loans of the same market value, because PSD contracts precipitate default, increase 
bankruptcy costs, and reduce firm value.  Moreover, the inefficiency of PSD is greater when the 
slope of performance pricing is steeper.  This finding suggests that the existence of PSD 
obligations should be explained by other market frictions, and recent research illuminates some 
possibilities.  Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2009) demonstrate that PSD can be used as a 
signaling or screening device in a setting with asymmetric information.  Tchistyi (2009) shows 
that it is optimal to issue PSD in a dynamic setting with moral hazard.  Asquith, Beatty, and 
Weber (2005) suggest that PSD can reduce contracting costs. 
In this paper we develop and test a further theory, that PSD contracts enable executives to 
transfer value to themselves at the expense of shareholders.  In particular, our paper tests whether 
the existence and strength of PSD contract terms are related to managers’ incentives from 
ownership and compensation.2  Performance pricing increases the volatility of the firm’s net cash 
                                                 
1 For example, see “Credit ratings can harm your wealth,” Investment Adviser, December 9, 2002. 
 
2 PSD may also enable a firm to raise funds in the presence of financing constraints that prevent it from issuing 
straight debt.  According to this hypothesis, PSD contracts could create value by enabling investment in more 
profitable projects when a firm is constrained (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)).  However, the firms in our 
sample are large public companies with relatively good access to external markets, and we were unable to find 
significant evidence of this effect. 
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flow and consequently the volatility of equity returns.  This creates a potential conflict of interest 
between the firm’s managers and shareholders, in which managers may enter into debt contracts 
that reduce share values.  This could occur because higher stock volatility due to performance 
pricing increases the value of stock options held by management, but it also may reduce the 
value of the firm because of the higher expected costs of financial distress.  As a result, equity 
value could decline, if we assume that banks that agree to performance sensitive loans negotiate 
pricing schedules that leave them no worse off than the alternative of issuing fixed rate debt.  
Indeed, Figure 1 shows that CEOs are more likely to choose PSD contracts after they receive 
large stock option awards. We illustrate this conflict of interest, which we call “negative hedging” 
by the manager, with a model in section III, and provide further details of this figure in section V. 
Our hypotheses about option-holding managers seeking PSD contracts differ from a 
similar conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, in which option-holding 
managers increase firm leverage in order to raise equity volatility.  This leverage effect, 
documented empirically by Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997), occurs when management 
substitutes debt for equity in the capital structure, thereby raising returns to equity holders in all 
positive future states of the world while reducing them in adverse future states.  The effect of a 
PSD contract is more subtle.  PSD contracts redistribute the gains to equity holders across certain 
future states, increasing returns to equity when the firm performs very well, while reducing them 
when performance lies in a middle range.  Figure 2 illustrates these differences by showing 
payoffs to equity holders under three hypothetical capital structures: an all equity firm, a levered 
firm with straight debt only, and a levered firm with PSD. 
We develop a model of firms’ financing choices between straight debt and PSD, in a 
representative company with a risk-averse CEO who holds both stock and options.  While 
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choosing PSD over straight debt increases the CEO’s option values due to higher stock volatility, 
the CEO also experiences a loss in expected utility due to larger expected bankruptcy costs and 
the increased stock volatility itself.  In the model, we first show analytical results for our main 
hypotheses under the assumptions of a risk-neutral CEO and a uniform distribution of expected 
future firm values.  We find that CEOs’ preferences for PSD over straight debt (and preferences 
for steeper PSD over flatter PSD) decrease with the value of stock owned by the CEO (i.e., when 
the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to stock price increases), and increase with the value of 
options owned (i.e., when the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to stock volatility increases).  
Using numerical simulations, we show that model predictions made from simple assumptions 
hold under more general assumptions that incorporate lognormal firm values and CEOs with 
power utility functions. 
To test the hypotheses implied by our model, we merge a large sample of commercial 
bank debt contracts with data about the equity ownership of the borrowing firms’ CEOs.  For 
each CEO in our sample, we calculate the delta, or sensitivity of stock and option values to 
changes in stock price, as well as the vega, or sensitivity of option values to changes in stock 
volatility.  We predict that managers with significant vega incentives from option holdings are 
likely to choose debt with a PSD feature and, within the subset of PSD contracts, should prefer 
steeper performance pricing schedules, since steep pricing schedules imply rapid appreciation of 
their option holdings when risk increases.  Conversely, managers with higher deltas from stock 
and options are likely to disfavor PSD contracts and, when PSD is used, to prefer arrangements 
with flatter slopes, because these managers should be more concerned about their exposure to the 
higher expected distress costs associated with PSD contracts. 
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The results of our analysis, based on Tobit regression estimations, support our hypotheses.  
Using a sample of 4,451 loan contracts (1,236 PSD and 3,215 straight debt) negotiated by 1,359 
U.S. companies from 1994 to 2002, we find that firms whose CEOs exhibit high deltas from 
their stock and option holdings tend to have flatter performance pricing schedules; one standard 
deviation increase from the mean in delta corresponds to a 39% decrease in the slope of the 
performance pricing schedule.  Conversely, we find that CEOs with high vegas from option 
inventories tend to have steeper performance pricing schedules: after controlling for 
heterogeneity in borrowers’ characteristics and loan characteristics, a one standard deviation 
increase from the mean of log (1+vega) corresponds to a 17% increase in the performance 
pricing schedule’s slope. 
We examine the relationship between CEOs’ incentives and the PSD slope more closely 
in two different ways. We look at the “interest-increasing” and “interest-decreasing” segments of 
the PSD slope, those that lie at credit ratings just below and just above the firm’s rating at the 
time of contracting.  We find a stronger relationship between CEOs’ delta incentives and the 
interest-increasing slope, implying that CEOs with high ownership are more concerned with 
avoiding expected costs of financial distress than with reaping the benefits of high rewards for 
performance improvements.  We also examine the convexity, rather than the slope, of the PSD 
pricing schedule, and we find that both local and overall convexity are positively associated with 
CEOs’ vega incentives and negatively related to their delta incentives. 
Our analysis of how executive compensation influences the choice between straight debt 
and PSD contributes to the literature by identifying a novel channel of managerial opportunism.  
While share repurchases and leverage increases raise volatility by changing net cash flows to 
equity holders, using PSD contracts in place of straight debt increases stock volatility by 
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redistributing net cash flows contingently across certain states of the future.  Hence, leverage 
choice and PSD choice can lead to different future cash flow consequences, and these two 
choices have different impacts upon the incentives of a CEO who derives private benefits from 
free cash flows (Jensen (1986)).  In addition, PSD’s relative lack of transparency makes it an 
attractive device for managers who wish to increase stock volatility.  PSD is widely issued, but 
its incentive effects are more complex than those of straight or convertible debt and it is difficult 
to value.3  More visible strategies for risk taking, such as undertaking risky investment projects 
or adding leverage to the capital structure, are easy for investors to observe and are often 
restricted by covenants on existing debt.  Identifying how managers with equity-based 
compensation may benefit from PSD can therefore increase investors’ awareness of the potential 
costs of PSD and improve investor protection. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the literature.  Section III presents our 
hypotheses.  Section IV presents institutional facts about PSD contracts and describes the data.  
Section V contains the basic analysis of the effects of managers’ deltas and vegas upon the terms 
of PSD contracts.  Section VI contains our conclusions. 
 
II. Review of the literature 
Despite PSD’s growing importance, research into its role in corporate lending has been 
limited.  Bhanot and Mello (2006), Tchistyi (2006), and Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2009) 
provide theoretical models of PSD from an optimal dynamic contracting perspective.  Bhanot 
and Mello (2006) is closely related to our work.  While those authors study the effect of PSD on 
                                                 
3 Stanford finance professor Darrell Duffie has stated in the news media that PSD contracts “have caused some 
head-scratching in terms of how to price them,” The New York Times, January 29, 2002.  
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asset substitution, which is the change in volatility due to moral hazard after a debt contract is in 
place, our study emphasizes the role of a PSD contract itself as a source of increased risk. 
The empirical literature on PSD begins with Beatty and Weber (2003), who study the role 
of PSD as part of earnings management, and continues with a large-sample study by Asquith, 
Beatty, and Weber (2005).  The authors partition their sample of PSD contracts into two groups: 
interest-decreasing loans, in which low-credit borrowers negotiate a schedule of interest 
reductions contingent upon improved performance, and interest-increasing loans, which stipulate 
rising interest rates should performance deteriorate.  The authors conjecture that different 
economic motives lead to these different forms of PSD and verify their hypotheses using 
variables related to historical default rates, return volatilities, and measures of credit rating 
precision and information asymmetry.  Our study extends these findings by providing evidence 
for the variation of specific contractual terms of PSD (the slope and convexity of the pricing 
schedule) rather than the simple binary choice between straight debt and PSD.  We also relate 
these choices to the sensitivities of the CEO contracts. 
Other empirical studies on topics related to PSD include Hillion and Vermaelen (2004), 
which studies the stock price reaction to death spiral convertibles, and Lando and Mortensen 
(2005) which studies the pricing of step-up bonds. 
Our paper is also related to the literature that links executive compensation and firms’ 
financial policies.  Prior studies note that equity-based compensation such as stock options may 
or may not encourage CEOs to take more risk.  A notable recent theory paper in this literature is 
Lewellen (2006).  Extending prior theoretical work on risk aversion and executive compensation 
(Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004)), Lewellen (2006) shows that option grants do not necessarily 
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encourage managers to increase leverage, because increased volatility imposes costs on risk-
averse managers. 
A number of empirical papers have found that increases in CEOs’ equity-based 
incentives are associated with greater financial risk in the areas of investment policies (Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2006)), risk-increasing acquisitions (Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001)), less corporate hedging (Tufano (1996), and Knopf, 
Nam, and Thornton (2002)), increases in stock volatility (DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990), 
Guay (1999), and Cohen, Hall, and Viceira (2000)), larger firm-specific risk (Jin (2002)), and 
increases in cash flow volatility (Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002)).  Mehran (1992), and Berger, 
Ofek, and Yermack (1997) show that option grants encourage entrenched managers to increase 
leverage.  Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005) show a negative relationship between CEOs 
with stock ownership and corporate debt maturity, implying that large stock ownership reduces 
manager-shareholder conflicts and leads managers to voluntarily subject themselves to more 
monitoring from short-term debt.  A somewhat contrasting result appears in Babenko (2009), 
which shows a decrease in stock and option grants after share repurchases, because repurchases 
increase pay-performance sensitivity and therefore act as a substitute for new equity 
compensation. 
 
III.  Hypothesis development 
A.  Model setup 
We consider a firm that needs to raise capital D at time t = 0 to invest in its projects and 
chooses to raise the capital in the form of debt. We assume that the firm can choose from a set of 
linear PSD loans: 
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ܥሺߥሻ ൌ ܿ଴ െ ܿଵߥ,     (1) 
where ߥ is the value of the firm and ܥሺߥሻ is the total (principal and interest) promised debt 
payment at time ݐ ൌ 1, and parameters ܿ଴ and ܿଵ are nonnegative constants (ܿ଴ ൒ 0, ܿଵ ൒ 0).
4 
We note that straight debt is a special case of a linear PSD (ܿଵ ൌ 0).
5 
The firm is in default when ܥሺߥሻ ൐ ߥ, i.e., ߥ ൏ ஽ܸሺܿ0, ܿ1ሻ ؠ
௖బ
ଵା௖భ
 (default boundary). We 
assume that a deadweight bankruptcy cost equals fraction γ of the firm’s value. The firm is 
liquidated at ݐ ൌ 1, and its value v at time ݐ ൌ 1 is distributed according to p.d.f. ݂ሺߥሻ. 
Assuming that the market is competitive and risk-neutral, the market value of the debt is 
a function of the PSD parameters and is given by:  
ܦሺܿ଴, ܿଵሻ ൌ
ଵ
ଵା௥೑
ቄ׬ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߥ݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ
௏ವ
଴ ൅ ׬ ሺܿ଴ െ ܿଵߥሻ
ஶ
௏ವ
݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥቅ  (2) 
where rf is the risk-free rate, and ஽ܸ denotes function ஽ܸሺܿ଴, ܿଵሻ. We impose the following 
restriction on the parameters ܿ଴ and ܿଵ: 
ଵ
ଵା௥೑
ቄ׬ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߥ݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ
௏ವ
଴ ൅ ׬ ሺܿ଴ െ ܿଵߥሻ
ஶ
௏ವ
݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥቅ ൌ ܦ଴    (3) 
  ௗ஽ሺ௖బ,௖భሻ
ௗ௖బ
 ൌ ଵ
ଵା௥೑
ቄ׬ ݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ
ஶ
௏ವ
െ ఊ
ଵା௖భ
஽ܸ݂ሺ ஽ܸሻቅ ൐ 0                                    (4) 
Equation (3) says that the amount ܦ଴ that the firm borrows at time zero is fixed, no matter what 
PSD is chosen. Equation (4) says that the firm is not extremely overleveraged, in the sense that 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, we allow debt payment C(v) to be negative when v is sufficiently large. However, our results still 
hold if we assume that the PSD is non-negative: max ሼ0, ܿ଴ െ ܿଵߥሽ. 
 
5 We acknowledge that choices of capital structure can also be driven by managerial incentives (see, for example, 
Lewellen (2006)). However, in the main model, we do not consider the possibility of equity financing, as it would 
divert attention from our main focus.  Later in this section we consider the effect of leverage on a manager’s 
incentives.  We show that, in addition to changes in stock volatility, changes in leverage are associated with changes 
in free cash flows, from which managers may derive private benefits.  This contrasts with PSD choices, which 
increase stock volatility by redistributing net cash flows, and leave total expected free cash flows unchanged.  We 
also point out that adjusting performance pricing provisions can be done more easily than changing leverage.  
Leverage is easily observable by shareholders, who may question a manager’s decision to change it, while 
performance pricing schedule adjustments are more likely to go unnoticed. 
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an increase in the debt payment does not lead to a reduction of the debt value. From now on, we 
will assume that  ܦ଴ is sufficiently low so that equation (4) is satisfied. 
The manager with utility function ܷሺܹሻ holds n shares of the firm and m stock options 
with the strike price K expiring on date ݐ ൌ 1. In addition, he will be paid wage ݓଵ and has 
outside wealth of ݓ଴. Let N be the number of shares outstanding. Assuming m<<N, the stock 
price at ݐ ൌ 1 is given by 
ଵܵሺߥሻ ൌ
௠௔௫ሼఔି஼ሺఔሻ,଴ሽ
ே
      (5) 
The call option pays 
ܩଵሺߥሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔሼ ଵܵሺߥሻ െ ܭ, 0ሽ ൌ ቊ
0 ݂݅ ߥ ൑ ௄ܸ
ఔି஼ሺఔሻ
ே
െ ܭ ݂݅ ߥ ൐ ௄ܸ
  (6) 
where  ௄ܸ ൌ
௖బାே௄
ଵା௖భ
 (option exercise boundary). Hence, the manager’s wealth at time t = 1 is 
given by  
ଵܹሺߥሻ ൌ ݓ଴ ൅ ݓଵ ൅ ݊ ଵܵሺߥሻ ൅ ݉ܩଵሺߥሻ          (7) 
  At time zero the manager chooses PSD that maximizes his expected utility: 
max௖బஹ଴, ௖భஹ଴ ׬ ܷ൫ ଵܹሺߥሻ൯݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ
ஶ
଴     (8) 
subject to equation (3). 
At t = 0, the stock price is equal to  
ܵ଴ ൌ
ଵ
ேሺଵା௥೑ሻ
ቄ׬ ሺߥ െ ሺܿ଴ െ ܿଵߥሻሻ
ஶ
௏ವ
݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥቅ.    (9) 
The sum of the equity value and the PSD value at t = 0 is equal to expected present value 
of the firm minus the expected losses resulting from the bankruptcy BC: 
ܵ଴ ൅ ܦ଴ ൌ
ଵ
ଵା௥೑
׬ ߥ
ஶ
଴ ݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ െ ܤܥ,                                                  (10) 
where the bankruptcy cost is given by 
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ܤܥ ൌ ଵ
ଵା௥೑
ቄ׬ ߛߥ݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ
௏ವ
଴ ቅ.      (11) 
The value of the call option at t = 0 is equal to  
ܩ଴ ൌ
ଵ
ሺଵା௥೑ሻ
ቄ׬ ቀ
ሺଵା௖భሻ௩ି௖బ
ே
െ ܭቁ
ஶ
௏಼
݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥቅ    (12) 
B.  Comparative statics 
Using the model, we can examine how optimal PSD contracts change for various 
parameters of interest. For our empirical tests, we are mainly interested in how a CEO’s equity 
incentives are related to optimal PSD contract choices (ܿ଴, ܿଵ).  
We can regard ܿ଴ as a function of ܿଵ, which is implicitly defined by (3). The following 
lemma shows how the PSD intercept ܿ଴ and default boundary ஽ܸ on the PSD slope ܿଵ.  
 
Lemma 1: (1) PSD intercept ܿ଴ increases with PSD slope ܿଵ: 
ௗ௖బሺ௖భሻ
ௗ௖భ
൒ 0, 
(2) Default boundary ஽ܸ increases with PSD slope ܿଵ: 
ௗ௏ವሺ೎బሺ೎భሻ,೎భሻ
ௗ௖భ
൒ 0. 
 
Detailed proofs of the lemmas and propositions of this section are shown in the Appendix. 
The first point of Lemma 1 follows from equation (3), which requires that the market 
value of the PSD at time t = 1 remains fixed. The second point follows the first one, noting that 
larger fixed repayment (ܿ଴) will lead to more repayment in low ߥ regions and make default more 
likely. Overall, Lemma 1 is consistent with findings of Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2009) 
who analyze PSD in a dynamic setting with an endogenous default boundary.  
The next proposition demonstrates that while PSD slope ܿଵ negatively affects bankruptcy 
costs and the stock value, it increases the option value.  
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Proposition 1:  (1) Expected bankruptcy cost BC increases with PSD slope ቀௗ஻஼
ௗ௖భ
൑ 0ቁ,  
 (2) Equity value ܵ଴ decreases with PSD slope ܿଵ ቀ
ௗௌబ
ௗ௖భ
൑ 0ቁ, 
 (3) Option value ܩ଴ increases with PSD slope ܿଵ ቀ
ௗீబ
ௗ௖భ
൐ 0ቁ, if ߛ ൏ ߛכ, where  
  ߛכ ൌ ሺଵା௖భሻ௉ሺ௩ஹ௏ವሻ௉ሺ௩ஹ௏಼ሻሺாሾ௩|௩ஹ௏಼ሿିாሾ௩|௩ஹ௏ವሿሻ
௏ವ௙ሺ௏ವሻ׬ ሺ௩ି௏ವሻ௙ሺఔሻௗఔ
ಮ
ೇ಼
. 
 
Expected bankruptcy cost increases with ܿଵ, because default boundary ஽ܸ increases with 
ܿଵ.  A steeper PSD slope leads to a lower stock value because of higher bankruptcy costs, while 
it leads to a higher option value due to the convexity of option payoffs. Overall, Lemma 1 and 
the first two points of Proposition 1 are consistent with findings of Manso, Strulovici, and 
Tchistyi (2009) who analyze PSD in a dynamic setting with an endogenous default boundary. 
The last point of Proposition 1 is a new result. From now on we will assume that ߛ ൏ ߛכ so that 
ௗீబ
ௗ௖భ
൐ 0. 
Based on the results of Proposition 1, we can develop our main hypotheses that (1) a 
CEO with high delta compensation package (large stock ownership) will choose a flatter PSD 
contract, and (2) a CEO with high vega compensation package (large option grants) will choose a 
steeper PSD contract.   
Indeed, a risk-neutral CEO maximizes his expected wealth ݓ଴ ൅ ݓଵ ൅ ݊ܵ଴ሺߥሻ ൅ ݉ܩ଴ሺߥሻ. 
When a CEO holds more shares, he cares more about the negative impact of the PSD slope on 
the stock and prefers flatter PSD slopes. When a CEO holds more options, he cares more about 
the positive impact of the PSD slope on options and prefers steeper PSD slopes. A risk-averse 
CEO will be less willing to choose PSD. However, it is straightforward to show that if either the 
CEO’s risk aversion is low or the number of options owned by the CEO is high, then the CEO 
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will still prefer PSD over straight debt, although the optimal PSD slope ܿଵ will be smaller than 
that for the risk-neutral CEO. 
To illustrate further the model’s predictions, we consider a numerical example with 
power utility ܷሺܹሻ ൌ ௐ
భషഐ
ଵିఘ
. For parameter values related to executive compensation 
characteristics, we chose values that are representative of the ExecuComp database: total 
outstanding number of shares (N) of 5 billion, CEO’s number of equity shares (n) of 5 million, 
CEO’s number of option shares (m) of 10 million, CEO’s initial wealth (ݓ଴) of $50 million, and 
strike price of $1. We chose a risk-free rate of 1.57%, which is the recent yield of a 1-month 
Treasury bill, fractional bankruptcy cost (γ) of 10%, and coefficient of risk aversion (ρ) of 2. 
Finally we assume that ν follows a lognormal distribution. 
The outcomes of our numerical simulations, showing comparative statics of the optimal 
PSD intercept (ܿ଴) and slope (ܿଵ) with respect to a range of important variables, are shown in 
Figures 3a through 3d. 
The main hypotheses of our paper concern the relationship between a CEO’s equity 
incentives and the firm’s debt financing choice. Figure 3a shows that CEOs’ preferences for PSD 
decline as they hold more shares in their own firms. A higher PSD slope increases expected 
bankruptcy costs, which makes the stock less valuable. In contrast, Figure 3b shows that CEOs’ 
preferences for a steep PSD slope increase as they hold more options, because of the option 
values’ increase in volatility induced by the PSD contract. Also, the optimal PSD intercept (ܿ଴) 
mimics the trend of the optimal PSD slope (ܿଵ), which is consistent with the predictions of 
Lemma 1 (ௗ௖బ
ௗ௖భ
൒ 0). Together, the results in Figures 3a and 3b imply that the choice of a PSD 
contract should be a decreasing function of a CEO’s overall delta, or the sensitivity of his wealth 
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to changes in the stock price, and an increasing function of the vega, or the sensitivity of his 
wealth to changes in stock volatility.  
Figures 3c and 3d show that a CEO’s choice of a PSD slope decreases with higher 
fractional bankruptcy costs and a greater risk-aversion coefficient, respectively. The reason for 
these results lies in the tendency of PSD to increase stock volatility.  
 
C.  Further extensions: leverage and free cash flows 
The model described above can be extended to explore the effect of changes in leverage 
on managerial incentives. Prior research by Jensen (1986) notes that managers may divert firms’ 
free cash flow for their own private benefit, and reducing free cash flows by increasing leverage 
can mitigate such problems. In order to incorporate the free cash flow effect of leverage, 
consider a firm whose risk-neutral manager can raise ߣܦ଴ from debt and ሺ1 െ ߣሻܦ଴ from equity. 
Also, we assume that fraction 1 െ ߮ of the free cash flow ߥ െ ܥሺߥሻ is returned to the 
shareholders and fraction ሺ1 െ ߠሻ߮ሺߥ െ ܥሺߥሻሻ of the free cash flow is diverted by the CEO for 
his own private benefit. 6 The diversion of free cash flow incurs a deadweight cost of ߠ߮ሺߥ െ
ܥሺߥሻሻ. 
In this case, the competitive lending condition for the creditors becomes 
ߣܦ଴ ൌ
ଵ
ଵା௥೑
ቄ׬ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߥ݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ
௏ವ
଴ ൅ ׬ ሺܿ଴ െ ܿଵߥሻ
ஶ
௏ವ
݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥቅ   (13) 
and for the fair return of new equity, holders require 
ሺ1 െ ߣሻܦ଴ ൌ ௡ܰ௘௪
ଵ
ଵା௥೑
ܧሾ ଵܵሺߥሻሿ,    (14) 
where ݏሺߥሻ is the price per share of the firm’s equity after new equity issuance, 
                                                 
6 To emphasize the effect of free cash flow in the Jensen (1986) sense, we consider ߥ െ ܥሺߥሻ as free cash flow. This 
implicitly assumes that all of the residual value in excess of debt repayment is stored in cash or liquid assets. 
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ଵܵሺߥሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔ ቄ
ሺଵିఝሻሺఔି஼ሺఔሻሻ
ேାே೙೐ೢ
, 0ቅ ൌ ൝
0 ݂݅ ߥ ൑ ஽ܸ
ሺଵିఝሻሺఔି஼ሺఔሻሻ
ேାே೙೐ೢ
݂݅ ߥ ൒ ஽ܸ
.   (15) 
The value of an option becomes 
ܩଵሺߥሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔሼ ଵܵሺߥሻ െ ܭ, 0ሽ ൌ ൝
0 ݂݅ ߥ ൑ ௄ܸ
ሺଵିఝሻሺఔି஼ሺఔሻሻ
ேାே೙೐ೢ
െ ܭ ݂݅ ߥ ൒ ௄ܸ
   (16) 
Hence, the manager’s wealth becomes 
ଵܹሺߥሻ ൌ ݓ଴ ൅ ݓଵ ൅ ݊ ଵܵሺߥሻ ൅ ݉ܩଵሺߥሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ߮ሺߥ െ ܥሺߥሻሻ.   (17) 
The manager’s expected value of private benefit (PB) becomes 
ܲܤ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ߮ ׬ ൫ߥ െ ܥሺߥሻ൯
ஶ
௏ವ
݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ.     (18) 
The following proposition shows that the manager’s private benefit is decreasing in leverage 
(and ߣ) while keeping its PSD slope (ܿଵ) fixed.  
 
Proposition 2: For a fixed PSD slope (ܿଵ), private benefit is decreasing in the fraction of funds 
raised by debt (ߣ). 
 
Proposition 2 highlights one of the key differences between changing leverage and 
changing PSD slope from the managerial incentive viewpoint. Steeper PSD slopes increase stock 
volatility by redistributing net cash flows while leaving total expected free cash flow unchanged. 
In contrast, higher leverage increases stock volatility, as noted in prior studies (e.g., Lewellen 
(2006), and Babenko (2009)), but it also reduces total expected free cash flow, from which 
managers may extract private benefits. Hence, a manager who seeks to obtain private benefits by 
increasing stock volatility will generally do better by holding leverage fixed and increasing the 
PSD slope, rather than the alternative of simply increasing leverage. 
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IV.  Data description 
We obtain data about PSD contracts from the Dealscan database, which contains detailed 
information on more than 100,000 loans, high-yield bonds, and private placements, mostly to 
larger borrowers.  From 1994 to the present, Dealscan reports information about PSD features 
when they appear in debt contracts, including the PSD pricing grid.  A pricing grid is essentially 
a step function schedule of interest payments contingent upon some aspect of the borrower’s 
future performance or financial health, such as its debt rating. 
 Table 1 shows three loans from Nortel Networks Inc., illustrating how typical PSD 
contracts are described in performance pricing grids.  These loans were 364-day facilities 
borrowed from syndicates of banks during 2001 and 2002, a period during which the company’s 
credit rating was in decline.  On July 31, 2001, Nortel‘s S&P senior debt rating was A, which 
subsequently fell to BBB- on December 20, 2001, and then to “not-rated” on April 8, 2002.  The 
loan amounts ranged from $660 million to $1.22 billion. 
Performance grids for the three loan contracts appear at the bottom of Table 1 and in 
Figure 4.  Performance spreads are measured in basis points over LIBOR and are contingent 
upon the borrower’s credit rating.  The first contract specified future credit rating contingencies 
below the borrower’s current credit rating, while the last contract specified future credit rating 
contingencies higher than current borrower’s credit rating.  The former is called an interest-
increasing PSD contract, and the latter is referred to as an interest-decreasing PSD contract.  The 
performance grid of the first contract, when Nortel was A-rated, ranged from A to BBB-, while 
the performance grids when Nortel was BBB- or NR rated ranged from BBB+ to BB.  Thus, the 
performance grids specified detailed pricing schedules near a borrower’s current credit rating, 
while leaving ranges far from the current rating as a flat schedule.  Finally, the number of pricing 
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steps was smaller when Nortel had high credit quality (A rated) compared to when it had poor 
credit quality (BBB- and NR). 
According to Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005), Dealscan reports five major types of 
financial measures found among the universe of PSD contracts: debt-to-EBITDA ratio (used in 
53.3% of contracts), debt ratings (24.9%), interest coverage ratio (8.4%), fixed charge ratio 
(4.8%), and leverage (8.6%).  Among these possible variables, we examine those using the 
senior debt rating as a measure of a borrower's performance.7  This choice allows us to compare 
performance spreads across firms at different times.  Also, the senior debt rating may be subject 
to less manipulation by managers than other PSD criteria.  Beatty and Weber (2003) show that 
managers with PSD contracts tend to influence accounting information when performance 
measures are directly based on accounting figures.  To achieve standardization of contract 
formats within the subsample we study, we narrow our observations to contracts issued between 
1994 and 2002, by companies outside the financial industry (SIC codes 60–69), with LIBOR-
based spreads, and without multiple performance criteria. 
The riskiness of a PSD contract is measured by the slope of its performance pricing 
schedule.  A steep slope indicates low interest payments when a firm performs well and high 
interest payments when a firm performs poorly.  A flat slope, in contrast, indicates an ordinary 
fixed-rate debt contract, where constant interest payments are charged regardless of how a firm 
performs.  Measuring the slope is complicated by the possibility that it might change over 
different ranges of the performance measure; the example presented earlier in this section shows 
exactly this situation, for a company whose pricing schedule is flatter at extreme levels of 
performance than in the middle range. 
                                                 
7 PSD contracts based upon credit rating generally use the higher of the senior debt ratings maintained by Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s for the issuing company at any given time.  Pricing grids for these contracts are generally 
expressed using the S&P notation (e.g., BBB instead of Baa). 
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We adopt two measures of the slope of a PSD contract, the “average slope” and the “local 
slope.”  An “average slope” is the mean PSD slope over all credit rating contingencies, and it 
measures a CEO’s appetite for risk over a long horizon.  A “local slope” is the PSD slope only 
for credit rating segments adjacent to the firm’s actual credit rating at the time of contract 
inception, and it measures a CEO’s appetite for risk in the short term.  To calculate average slope, 
we find the change in interest rates over each credit rating increment specified in a given PSD 
contract.  We then divide each incremental change by the market-wide difference in yields over 
the same increment at the time the contract was negotiated, using corporate bond yield data 
obtained from Moody’s.8  Under this scaling, a contract will exhibit a slope of one if it calls for a 
change in interest rates mirroring the profile of prevailing market yields.  The slope will exceed 
one if it is steeper than the market yield profile and will be less than one if it is flatter.  Fixed rate 
debt will have a slope of 0.  After calculating market-adjusted slopes for all rating increments 
individually, we take their mean value for each contract, over the range bounded by the upper 
and lower limits of credit ratings for which interest changes are specified (these upper and lower 
limits vary from one contract to another). 
Our calculation of local slope is quite similar.  Again we calculate the change in interest 
rates called for by the PSD contract over each rating increment and scale that change by the 
prevailing market-wide slope for each increment.  While the average slope calculation uses data 
for all increments specified under the contract, local slope is calculated as the average over the 
rating increments immediately above and immediately below the company’s rating at the time of 
contract negotiation.  Local slope is therefore: 
                                                 
8 Our market-wide data are based upon the Moody’s end-of-month value weighted average yield for long-term 
corporate bonds in each ratings class, according to data from the Citigroup YieldBook.  We thank Chenyang Wei for 
assistance in obtaining this data. 
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where Spread(n) is the firm’s interest cost above LIBOR at any rating n, Moody (n) is the market 
value-weighted average yield within rating class n, and i is the firm’s rating at the time of 
contract negotiation.  About 20% of our PSD contracts (281 observations out of 1,236) are 
written with the company’s current credit rating as a “corner point” of the pricing schedule—
meaning the changes in interest rates are specified only in one direction, exclusively above or 
exclusively below its current rating.  For these observations we calculate local slope using only 
the single rating increment adjacent to its current rating.  Figure 5 provides a graphical 
illustration of the calculation of local slope; intuitively, the slope of a PSD contract equals the 
change in spread (basis points above LIBOR) for each unit change in market spread at the firm’s 
current credit rating. 
To measure the convexity of a performance pricing profile r, we let ܥܴ௟  and ܥܴ௛ denote 
the lowest and the highest credit ratings used in the performance pricing schedule and ܰሺܥܴሻ 
denote the number of credit rating notches between ܥܴ and ܥܴ௛.  We define the linear 
extrapolation of performance pricing schedule r as follows:  
ݎ௅ሺܥܴሻ ൌ ݎሺܥܴ௛ሻ ൅
௥ሺ஼ோ೗ሻି௥ሺ஼ோ೓ሻ
ேሺ஼ோ೗ሻ
ܰሺܥܴሻ.    (20) 
We define the convexity of performance pricing profile r as the greatest deviation from the linear 
extrapolation: 
ݔ௥ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊൫ݎ௅ሺܥܴሻ െ ݎሺܥܴሻ൯ · max஼ோאሾ஼ோ೓,஼ோ೗ሿ|ݎ௅ሺܥܴሻ െ ݎሺܥܴሻ|,  (21) 
where )(asign is 1 if 0≥a  and is -1 if 0<a . Figure 5 shows conceptually how we measure 
convexity. The large majority of our PSD contracts exhibit convexity according to this definition, 
although many contracts have inflection points between convex and concave segments, and our 
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definition classifies a minority of 120 observations, or about 9% of our PSD sample, as concave.  
In our calculations of convexity we assign negative values to the concave observations, so that 
concavity is essentially treated as “negative convexity.”  We calculate values of overall 
convexity and local convexity based on the same approach as used for average slope and local 
slope. 
We merge our sample of debt contracts from Dealscan with borrowers’ financial 
statement data from Compustat using a matching algorithm.9  We gather variables measuring 
firm size (natural log of total assets), leverage (short-term plus long-term debt over total assets), 
market-to-book ratio, cash flow (EBITDA), and the time series volatility of cash flow (the 
standard deviation of EBITDA over the four years prior to the loan year, standardized by the 
mean value over the same period). 
We obtain information on managerial compensation and ownership from the ExecuComp 
database.  Following Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (1999, 2002), we use the sensitivity of a 
CEO’s stock and option values to changes in stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of a CEO’s 
stock and option values to changes in stock return volatility (vega) as measures for incentives 
provided by managerial compensation and ownership.  Based on these measures, Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2006) find that higher vega leads to more risk-taking activities by management, 
such as lower investment in property, plant, and equipment; higher book leverage; and market 
leverage.  In contrast, higher delta leads to less risky financial policies such as a decrease in 
leverage and an increase in capital expenditures. 10 
                                                 
9 The process involves using text extracts to match firm names as they appear on each database.  After the automated 
matching process, we inspect each paired observation for errors due to pathologies of the algorithm.  We thank 
Charles Himmelberg for providing a conversion table and helpful advice. 
 
10 In this paper, we assume that PSD contracts are issued after compensation contracts are already made.  There is a 
concern that compensation contracts may change in response to PSD contracts.  We address this endogeneity issue 
by conducting a two-stage least squares Tobit regression, where delta and vega are endogenous variables.  Also, 
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We follow the procedure described by Core and Guay (2002) for constructing delta and 
vega, and we use these statistics as proxies for managerial incentives.  We match each PSD 
contract with the CEO’s prior year-end delta and vega for each issuing company.  The CEO’s 
delta is obtained by weighting each CEO’s delta for shares owned and delta for options owned 
by the number of shares and options held by that CEO.  The delta for stock is one by definition, 
and the delta for stock option holdings is based on the derivative of the Black-Scholes formula 
with respect to stock price.  To take account of the size of the CEO’s equity position relative to 
the total capitalization of the firm, we divide the delta of each CEO by the firm’s total shares 
outstanding plus the CEO’s options.  The approach, following the functional form used by 
Yermack’s (1995) study of delta incentives from CEO options, gives the value gain realized by 
each CEO for a $1.00 increase in the firm’s equity value.  Since the vega for stock is very close 
to zero,11 we only need to evaluate vega for option holdings, which is provided by the derivative 
of the Black-Scholes formula with respect to volatility.  Due to the skewness of vega’s 
distribution, we generally use the functional form log(1+vega) in our regression estimations. 
After discarding financial firms and companies without adequate data availability, we 
have a sample of 1,236 PSD contracts for 425 firms.  Together with 3,215 non-PSD contracts for 
                                                                                                                                                             
delta and vega are likely to change as the stock price changes, and the true value of delta and vega may differ from 
our measure, which uses annual closing stock price.  If these discrepancies between actual and annualized 
sensitivities occur randomly, we expect the measurement errors to cancel out on average over the whole sample. 
 
11 In theory, a stock’s vega may not be 0.  Our assumption is based on Guay’s (1999) empirical finding that vegas of 
stocks are very small relative to those of options, and can be approximated as 0: In Table 2 of Guay (1999), the 
mean executive option vega is 0.167 (standard deviation 0.105), while mean of stock’s vega is 0.005 (standard 
deviation 0.016).  The PSD issuers in our sample are mostly investment grade firms.  Hence, stock convexity for 
PSD issuers should not be of great concern. 
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934 firms, our whole sample consists of 4,451 contracts for 1,359 firms who compete in 57 
different primary two-digit SIC industries.12  Table 2 presents summary statistics. 
Comparing CEO incentives in firms with and without PSD contracts, we find little 
difference in delta but a significant difference in log(1+vega): The mean CEO delta is 0.023 for 
the PSD loan sample, while that of the non-PSD loan sample is 0.024.  The vega, in contrast, is 
larger for the PSD sample than the non-PSD sample, with the difference significant at the 1% 
level. 
Since the firms in our sample are public companies with bank relationships, they tend to 
be large.  The median market capitalization for the PSD sample is $3.1 billion, while that of the 
non-PSD sample is $2.5 billion.  The median value of total assets is $4.2 billion for firms with 
PSD contracts and is $3.3 billion for firms without PSD contracts, which is substantially larger 
than the average for the entire Compustat population.  Firms with PSD contracts have lower 
market-to-book ratios and cash flow (EBITDA) than those without PSD contracts.  PSD 
borrowers are somewhat older than straight debt borrowers.  Figure 6 shows that both PSD and 
non-PSD issuers in our sample generally have high credit quality, but the distribution is 
somewhat tighter for PSD, with straight debt accounting for most of the observations with very 
high and very low ratings.13  We do not find noticeable industry differences in our samples of 
PSD and non-PSD contracts.  Table 3 presents the five highest and lowest industries for PSD use, 
ranked according to the ratio of PSD contracts over all debt contracts in our sample.  Industries 
are arranged according to the 48 Fama-French SIC groups. 
                                                 
12 Approximately 30% of our sample has useable PSD contracts because we only use those based on credit rating.  
In our Dealscan data source, 44% of the contracts have PSD features, suggesting that PSD contracts are almost as 
popular as straight debt. 
 
13 A certain number of observations are nonrated in both the PSD and non-PSD samples and are not used in Figure 6. 
It is possible for a nonrated bond to have a PSD pricing schedule based upon its credit rating, and this happens 72 
times in our sample. In these cases the loan contract generally treats nonrated status as equivalent to having the 
lowest possible credit rating. 
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Loan characteristics of PSD contracts and ordinary debt contracts also exhibit noticeable 
differences.  Loan amounts for PSD contracts are larger than those for the ordinary debt contracts, 
and the numbers of lenders involved in PSD contracts are significantly larger than those involved 
in ordinary debt contracts.  This is consistent with Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005), who find 
that performance pricing is used to reduce renegotiation costs, which can become prohibitively 
high when many lenders are involved.  PSD contracts have shorter maturity than ordinary debt 
contracts. 
Our summary statistics for the average slope and local slope of PSD contracts indicate 
mean values of approximately 0.28 and 0.31, respectively.  Our measure of overall convexity 
exhibits mean and median values just below 0.20, indicating that pricing schedules tend to be 
bowed toward the origin at a maximal deviation of about 20% below the linear projection 
between a schedule’s endpoints.  However, most PSD contracts exhibit very little convexity near 
the debt rating at the time of contract inception, as the mean value for local convexity is just 0.02 
and the median value for local convexity is 0. 
In Table 4 we show the sample correlations between average slope, local slope, overall 
convexity, local convexity, and a fifth variable equal to the number of individual rating steps 
specified in each PSD contract.  These five quantities are used as dependent variables in our 
regression analysis below.  We show correlations both for the entire sample, including fixed-rate 
debt with no pricing schedule, and for the subsample of PSD contracts only.  In the upper panel, 
we see strong correlations among most of the dependent variables within the overall sample, due 
to the majority of zero-valued observations for all four of them.  For example, the correlation 
between average slope and local slope is 0.823, and all correlations are significant at least at the 
5% level.  
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Within the subsample of PSD contracts, sample correlations have much more modest 
magnitudes, the largest being the correlation of 0.526 between average slope and local slope.  
The two convexity measures exhibit weakly negative correlations with both average slope and 
local slope. 
 
V. Analysis of PSD contract terms 
In this section, we examine the impact of CEOs’ equity incentives on firms’ choices of 
PSD contract parameters.  We expect CEOs with high values of vega to prefer more risky PSD 
contracts, and CEOs with high values of delta to prefer less risky contracts. 
Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence that CEO incentives play an important role in the 
decision to issue PSD instead of straight debt.  The figure shows PSD issuance frequencies for a 
subsample of 248 CEOs who received very large stock option awards, which we define as more 
than 1% of the company’s outstanding shares.  We display the probability that the firm’s next 
debt issue following a large CEO option award is PSD, with the data shown separately 
depending upon whether the last debt issue prior to the option award was PSD or straight debt.  
For comparison purposes, data are also shown in the same format for our remaining sample of 
4,203 pairs of debt contracts issued in sequence by individual firms, with no large CEO stock 
option award occurring between each contract pair.  The figure shows that while prior PSD 
issuers continue to exhibit a preference for PSD in their next debt contracts, a large CEO option 
award leads to a markedly greater likelihood of PSD issuance regardless of the characteristics of 
the prior issue.  Among the group of prior straight debt issuers, for instance, the probability that 
the next debt issue is PSD is about 40% following the receipt of a large option award by the CEO, 
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and about 25% otherwise.  The difference is somewhat less dramatic for prior PSD issuers but is 
statistically significant at the 5% level in both cases. 
 
A. Slope 
We begin by using the slope of the PSD performance pricing schedule as our measure of 
the risk of a PSD contract.  Because the straight-debt contracts in our sample exhibit zero slope 
by definition, we employ a Tobit regression specification: 
Slope Slopei i= max( , )* 0  
Slope Delta Vega Xi Industry Year i i i i
* = + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +α α α β β γ ε1 2    (22) 
ε σi N~ ( , )0 2  
iSlope  is the dependent variable (the slope of PSD contract), Deltai  is the delta of a CEO’s 
equity grants normalized by shares outstanding, Vegai  is the vega of a CEO’s equity grants 
specified as log(1+vega), Xi  are control variables, α Industry  are two-digit SIC dummy variables, 
αYear  are year dummy variables, and εi  is the error term.  We draw independent variables from 
prior literature on CEO compensation (e.g., Core and Guay (1999)) and on capital structure (e.g., 
Barclay and Smith (1995)) to control for heterogeneity in borrowers’ characteristics and loan 
characteristics.  These control variables in our models include firm size, leverage, market-to-
book ratio, return on assets (based upon EBITDA), the time series volatility of EBITDA (the 
standard deviation over the prior 4 years, scaled by the mean over the prior 4 years), and an 
indicator variable for whether the firm’s senior debt is rated by either Moody’s or Standard & 
Poor’s.  To control for heterogeneity in loan characteristics, we use loan amount (scaled by total 
assets) and the log of maturity, as well as the log of the total number of PSD contracts for each 
firm reported in Dealscan, whether or not these contracts meet the data criteria for inclusion on 
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our sample.  These control variables account for differences in borrowing capacity, investment 
opportunities and activities, uncertainty in borrowers’ performance, and basic loan conditions.  
To account for the clustering of PSD contracts within firms and the heteroskedasticity of the 
error terms (ε), we cluster all standard errors at the firm level. 
 As suggested by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), a CEO’s incentive structure (e.g., 
delta and vega) and aspects of the firm’s capital structure (e.g., leverage and PSD choice) are 
determined simultaneously by many of the same economic forces.  For example, firms with 
growth opportunities may benefit from motivating a risk-averse CEO to invest in high risk 
projects.  These firms may offer a high vega compensation package, and the CEO in turn may 
seek out further risky growth opportunities.  As a result, the causality of the CEO’s incentive 
structure and the firm’s risk profile may run on both directions.  To deal with this possibility, 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) employ a simultaneous equations model.  Since the dependent 
variable of our paper is censored at zero (i.e., PSD slope), we employ a simultaneous equations 
model in a Tobit framework (i.e., 2SLS Tobit).  While this model is not widely used in prior 
corporate finance research, it has been well developed in the labor economics literature to study 
female labor force participation (see, e.g., Connelly (1992) and Smith and Blundell (1986)). 
For nearly all of our models, Wald tests indicate that the null hypothesis of exogeneity for 
delta and vega is rejected, so we adopt the two-stage least squares approach in our regressions 
throughout the paper.  To implement this model, we need separate independent variables for the 
first-stage OLS models of CEOs’ delta and vega incentives.  We estimate the delta model with 
the dependent variables equal to the log of cash compensation (salary plus bonus), one-year 
earnings growth, return to shareholders, the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) governance index, 
firm size (log of total assets), years of tenure as CEO, year dummy variables, and two-digit 
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industry dummy variables.  For the vega model, the independent variables are the log of cash 
compensation, return to shareholders, the governance index, the market-to-book ratio, and two-
digit industry dummies.  Prior studies such as Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find these 
variables to be influential on executive compensation characteristics (e.g., delta and vega), and 
hence, they are likely to be good candidates as instruments for our test. The null hypotheses of 
weak instruments based on F-tests proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) are strongly rejected for 
both delta (F-stats = 59.26) and vega (F-stats = 12.34), which further confirms the validity of our 
instruments.14 
As a measure for the goodness of the fit of the Tobit model, we adopt: 
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where iyˆ  is the value predicted by a maximum likelihood estimation, iy  is the actual value 
observed in the data, and y  is the sample mean.15 
 The first two columns of Table 5 show parameter estimates for our two-stage least 
squares Tobit with the dependent variables equal to the average and local slopes of the 
performance pricing function.  As shown in the table, we find that a CEO’s delta has a negative 
impact on firms’ choices of PSD slopes (significant for average slope but not local slope), 
whereas vega has a significantly positive impact that is similar for both dependent variables.  
                                                 
14 We also assume that these instruments are independent from the second-stage residuals. Unfortunately, we are 
unable to find formal tests for this assumption. However, given that the second-stage dependent variables are not 
directly linked to CEO compensation, it seems to be a reasonable assumption. 
 
15 In nonlinear regression, there is no well-behaved counterpart to the R2 from linear regression.  One of the 
shortcomings of the above fit measure is that it does not relate to the proportion of variation explained; it only 
ranges from 0 to 1 because of a mechanical normalization.  For further discussion on fit measures for nonlinear 
regressions, we refer the reader to the modeling guide of LIMDEP software, which we use for the estimation of our 
Tobit model (Greene (2002)). 
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These estimates are consistent with our moral hazard hypothesis that CEOs with high delta prefer 
flatter PSD contracts to mitigate the expected costs of financial distress, while CEOs with high 
vega prefer steeper PSD contracts because they increase the riskiness of the firm and volatility of 
stock returns. 
To assess the economic significance of the estimated coefficients for the CEO delta and 
vega variables, we evaluate the impact of a one standard deviation change in each variable upon 
the average slope.  Based on the descriptive statistics from Table 2, a one standard deviation 
increase in the CEO’s delta, which is 0.046, corresponds to a decrease of 0.1 in the average slope 
of the pricing schedule, according to estimates in the left column of Table 5.  Compared to the 
median value of 0.254, this change implies a reduction in magnitude of about 39%.  In terms of 
credit spreads, an average fixed rate loan in our sample has 60 b.p. and the median difference 
between the maximum and minimum spread in a PSD grid is 50 b.p.  That is, relative to a fixed 
rate loan, a typical PSD contract in our sample charges 35 b.p. more at the highest credit rating 
of the PSD contract, and 85 b.p. at the lowest credit rating.  For a one standard deviation change 
in delta, the average slope decreases to 15.4% (i.e., 0.254-0.1), and the difference between the 
minimum and maximum spreads decreases to 30 b.p.  That is, relative to a fixed rate loan, a 
typical PSD contract in our sample has 45 b.p. at the highest credit rating of the PSD contract, 
and 75 b.p. at the lowest credit rating of the PSD contract.  For an average firm with high cash 
flow, this change in credit spread may be insignificant.  However, for firms approaching 
financial distress, cash flows are often close to zero or negative, and such increase in spread at 
low credit rating will impose substantial extra burden on these firms.  For the log(1+vega) 
variable, a one standard deviation change in the vega variable implies a change in the PSD slope 
of about 17%.  All of these results about the importance of delta and vega are robust to various 
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combinations of subsets of control variables specified in Equation (22), as well as to tests on 
delta and vega alone by themselves without the other. 
 Analyzing estimates for other control variables in Table 5, we see that firms with smaller 
size, lower leverage, and higher cash flow (EBITDA) choose steeper PSD contracts.  These 
results are broadly consistent with certain theories in corporate finance about optimizing 
behavior of the borrowers and lenders.  For example, firms with high leverage may negotiate less 
risky PSD contracts to reduce agency costs of debt related to asset substitution.  Firms with 
higher cash flow likely face lower expected costs of financial distress and therefore bear fewer 
implicit costs from steeper-sloped PSD contracts.  
 Our results in the first two columns of Table 5 indicate a connection between the slope of 
PSD contracts and the structure of CEOs’ equity incentives.  To understand this link in greater 
detail, we investigate the PSD slope in both directions starting from the firm’s credit rating at the 
time of contract inception.  If a firm’s credit quality worsens, it moves into the “interest-
increasing” range of the PSD pricing schedule and must pay greater coupon rates.  In the other 
direction, if credit quality improves, the firm may move into the “interest-decreasing” PSD range 
and pay lower rates.  In our sample of 1,236 PSD contracts, approximately 14% are strictly 
interest increasing, specifying rate changes only in the direction of credit deterioration, and 
another 6% are strictly interest decreasing.  However, the overwhelming majority of 80% of 
contracts exhibit both interest-increasing and interest-decreasing slope components.  In the third 
and fourth columns of Table 5, we present regression results in which the dependent variable 
equals the slope of each of these pieces; for example, for the interest-increasing contracts, the 
dependent variable equals the actual PSD slope at all credit ratings below the current rating, and 
zero at all ratings above it. 
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 Estimates in the third and fourth columns of Table 5 indicate that the relation between the 
managers’ delta and the PSD slope is negative over both the interest-increasing and interest-
decreasing segments, but the magnitude is far stronger for the interest-increasing segment and is 
only significant in this direction.  We conclude that delta incentives cause managers to have 
greater concern over avoiding the costs of financial distress than with the possibility of reducing 
the firm’s credit costs in times of good performance.  This pattern recalls the “asymmetric 
benchmarking” of CEO compensation incentives documented by Garvey and Milbourn (2006). 
CEOs’ vega incentives are estimated as positive in both directions but without statistical 
significance. 
 In further estimations that are untabulated to save space, we investigate whether PSD 
slopes are associated with variables that proxy for expected bankruptcy costs and CEO risk 
aversion.  We use the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) over total assets as our proxy 
for bankruptcy costs, since debt recovery rates in chapter 11 would likely be correlated with asset 
tangibility.  For CEO risk aversion, we use an estimate of total CEO wealth equal to cash 
compensation plus the value of stock and option holdings, since risk aversion declines as a 
function of wealth for most people.  We find that, as predicted by our model, both of these 
variables have positive estimates when added to the regressions in Table 5.  However, only the 
CEO wealth variable is consistently significant; the PPE/total assets variable has estimates with 
marginal significance only in certain specifications, such as a dummy variable for firms in the 
top quintile.  Because the large majority of firms in our sample are quite far from financial 
distress, our data may lack sufficient cross-sectional variation in order to test the hypothesis 
related to expected bankruptcy costs. 
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B.  Convexity 
 Having identified significant relations between PSD contract slopes and CEO incentives, 
we examine whether similar patterns exist for the convexity of PSD contracts.  Convexity 
provides an alternative measure of PSD contract riskiness, since convex pricing schedules 
accelerate the rate of increase in interest payments and thereby accelerate the rate of financial 
burden as the firm approaches states of low cash flow.  Such convexity will increase the 
likelihood of financial distress, but it will also benefit CEOs with option-based risk incentives by 
providing very large rewards for improvements in firm performance.  Following similar 
arguments used in the previous section, we expect CEOs with high delta to prefer flat PSD 
contracts that avoid deterioration of firm value due to increased expected bankruptcy costs, while 
high vega CEOs should prefer riskier PSD contracts with convex performance pricing schedules. 
 We estimate least squares regressions to test associations between convexity and CEO 
incentive variables; the least squares framework is used instead of Tobit since a minority of PSD 
contracts—those with concave schedules—are treated as having negative values for convexity.  
As dependent variables, we use both overall and local measures of convexity; these are estimated 
over the entire contract performance range and the rating segments immediately adjacent to the 
rating at contract inception, respectively. 
Results of the estimations appear in Table 6.  Similar to our earlier findings about PSD 
slopes, we find significantly negative parameter estimates for the CEO delta variable in both 
models and significant positive estimates for vega in one out of two.  These results buttress our 
earlier evidence that managers with risk-taking incentives arising from option holdings use PSD 
contracts as a risk-shifting device, while managers with high ownership incentives from shares 
and options tend to do the opposite. 
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C. Impact of corporate governance 
The main theme of this paper is that PSDs can be used by CEOs to capture private gains 
at the expense of shareholders.  We therefore conjecture that firms with more entrenched 
managers will choose steeper-sloped PSD schedules and also prefer PSD over straight debt.  In 
this section, we test this hypothesis by relating PSD slopes to corporate governance. 
Anti-takeover provisions such as poison pills facilitate the entrenchment of corporate 
managers by shielding them from the threat of takeover.  We therefore augment our prior 
regression models with an indicator variable that equals one if a firm has a poison pill and zero 
otherwise.  As shown in Table 7, parameter estimates for the poison pill indicator are positive 
and statistically significant, implying that entrenched managers do elect debt contracts with 
steeper PSD slopes.  Parameter estimates for the main delta and log(1+vega) variables are similar 
to those presented earlier in Table 5.  We repeat this analysis using other measures of CEO 
entrenchment, such as indicators for a staggered board, the fraction of shares held by insiders, 
and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009) entrenchment index.  Results, which are untabulated 
to save space, are qualitatively similar with consistent indication that more entrenched CEOs 
prefer steeper PSD schedules. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
This paper explores the effect of CEO equity incentives on the structure of performance 
sensitive debt contracts.  PSD contracts require larger interest payments during a downturn in a 
borrower's performance but lower interest during states of performance improvement.  This 
pattern tends to increase firm risk and lower overall equity value by exacerbating the expected 
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costs of financial distress.  However, option holders would generally benefit from PSD contracts, 
since that pattern of payoffs to an optionee has a convex relation to overall equity value. 
We estimate relations between a large sample of PSD schedules and the structure of 
CEOs’ delta and vega incentives from their personal holdings of shares and options.  We find 
that CEOs with high vega incentives from their option holdings tend to choose steeper and more 
convex performance pricing schedules than those with low vegas.  These effects accord with our 
hypotheses about how the risk-taking incentives from personal option holdings should influence 
managers’ choices when negotiating PSD schedules.  Moreover, we find the opposite result for 
CEOs with high delta incentives, suggesting that they negotiate flatter and less steep PSD 
contracts in order to reduce the expected costs of financial distress.  Our results are robust to 
controls for corporate governance, expected bankruptcy costs, and managerial risk aversion, all 
of which also exhibit significant associations with patterns of PSD contract design. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1.  
(1) Differentiating (3) and taking into account that ஽ܸ ൌ
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The denominator is positive because of equation (4). The numerator is positive because  
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(2) Differentiating ஽ܸ ؠ
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ଵା௖భ
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Again, the denominator is positive because of equation (3). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
(1) ܤܥ ൌ ଵ
ଵା௥೑
ቄ׬ ߛߥ݂ሺߥሻ݀ߥ
௏ವ
଴ ቅ is increasing in ܿଵ because ஽ܸ is increasing in ܿଵ.   
(2) Because BC is increasing in ܿଵ and ܦ଴ is fixed, it follows from (10) that ଵܵ is 
decreasing in ܿଵ. 
(3) Differentiating (12) with respect to ܿଵ and taking into account (A2) and the fact that 
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where 
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The denominator is positive because of (1). Thus, ௗீబ
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Proof of Proposition 2. 
For a fixed ܿଵ, taking derivatives of ܿ଴ with respect to ߣ in the competitive lending 
condition (Equation 13) yields, 
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Table 1 
Examples of performance pricing grids 
Data for Nortel Networks Inc.'s syndicated 364-day facilities issued on July 31, 2001, December 20, 2001, 
and April 8, 2002, as reported by Dealscan.  Each loan’s pricing was tied to Nortel’s long-term senior 
unsecured rating by Standard & Poor’s.  Nortel's S&P senior debt rating was A on July 31, 2001, BBB- 
on December 20, 2001, and Not Rated on April 8, 2002.  The performance grids show spreads measured 
by basis points over LIBOR, contingent upon the company’s S&P rating. 
 
Loan characteristics Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 
Date July 31, 2001 December 20, 2001 April 8, 2002 
Type 364-day facility 364-day facility 364-day facility 
Amount $1,220 million $660 million $1,175 million 
Lenders in syndicate 10 11 25 
Lead bank Chase Manhattan  & Credit Suisse 
JPMorgan Chase 
& Credit Suisse JP Morgan Chase 
Senior Yes Yes Yes 
Secured No Yes N/A 
Covenant (million) $3,500 (Net worth) 
$1,880 
(Tangible net worth) N/A 
Company’s S&P senior debt rating A BBB- NR 
    
Performance grid (basis points over LIBOR) 
Greater than A 45 - - 
Greater than A- 55 - - 
Greater than BBB+ 77.5 77.5 77.5 
Greater than BBB 100 100 100 
Greater than BBB- 120 120 120 
Greater than BB+ - 150 150 
Greater than BB - 162.5 162.5 
Less than BB - 175 175 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics for a sample of performance sensitive debt (PSD) and regular debt contracts.  Data are drawn for observations representing 
the intersection of the Dealscan, Compustat, and ExecuComp databases between 1994 and 2002, from all industries except the financial industry 
(SIC 6000-6999).  The PSD sample includes only contracts for which the performance measure is based exclusively on the company’s senior S&P 
debt rating.  The delta and vega variables for each company’s CEO are based upon holdings of stock and options.  Leverage equals total debt / 
total assets.  Volatility of sales is the time series standard deviation of annual sales over the four years prior to the loan year, divided by the time 
series mean value.  The slope and convexity of the PSD loan pricing schedules are based on changes in the interest spread for different rating 
intervals, as described more completely in the text.  The PSD sample includes 1,236 contracts negotiated by 425 individual firms, while the non-
PSD sample includes 3,215 contracts from 934 firms. 
 
 PSD contracts Non-PSD contracts Difference in means
CEO incentives Median Mean Std. Dev.  Median Mean Std. Dev.  Difference t-statistic 
Delta 0.0072 0.0227 0.0457  0.0080 0.0243 0.0515  (0.0015) -0.92 
log(1+Vega) 15.9 14.8 4.3  15.6 14.3 4.6  0.5 3.23 
Cash compensation (000) 1275 1582 1162  1090 1498 1569  84 1.72 
Years tenure in office 5 7.7 7.5  5 7.3 6.8  0.4 1.83 
Borrower characteristics           
Market capitalization (mm) 3105 6714 10225  2490 12184 36809  (5470) -5.15 
Firm age (years) 30.0 33.5 21.0  29.0 33.3 22.4  0.1 0.14 
Total assets (mm) 4200 8944 15115  3348 12765 41904  (3821) -3.13 
Leverage  0.33 0.33 0.13  0.32 0.32 0.20  0.01 1.64 
Market-to-book ratio 1.38 1.66 0.95  1.39 1.76 1.21  (0.10) -2.65 
PP&E (mm) 1402 3495 5186  1118 3925 7530  (430) -1.85 
Cash flow (EBITDA, mm) 271 445 1156  203 620 2063  (175) -2.82 
Volatility of cash flow 0.309 0.506 2.104  0.309 0.557 10.918  (0.051) -0.16 
Senior debt rating at loan date BBB+    BB+      
Loan characteristics           
Amount (mm) 400 677 865  200 471 851  206 7.20 
Maturity (months) 36 36.3 23.1  30 40.7 40.1  (4.4) -3.67 
Number of lenders 14 16.1 11.0  5 8.6 9.6  7.5 22.44 
Steps in pricing schedule 5 5.1 1.1        
Average slope 0.254 0.283 0.154        
Local slope 0.282 0.313 0.230        
Overall convexity 0.195 0.185 0.178        
Local convexity 0.000 0.023 0.2423        
 42
Table 3 
PSD issuance frequency by industry: Highest and lowest 
Performance sensitive debt issuance frequency in various industries, according to observations from the 
Dealscan database between 1994 and 2002, from all industries except the financial industry (SIC 6000-
6999).  The table shows the fraction of PSD contracts in the five industries with the highest and lowest 
PSD frequencies, as well as the frequency for the overall sample.  Industries are sorted into 48 groups 
according to the Fama-French SIC code mapping.  Industries with fewer than 50 observations are not 
shown in the table. 
 
Industry 
 
Debt contracts in sample 
 
PSD frequency 
Printing and publishing 84 46.4% 
Construction materials 148 45.3% 
Apparel 97 42.3% 
Consumer goods 90 37.8% 
Chemicals 217 34.1% 
. . .   
ENTIRE SAMPLE 4,451 27.8% 
. . .   
Health care 44 25% 
Automobiles and trucks 131 16.0% 
Restaurants and lodging 79 13.9% 
Pharmaceuticals 95 11.6% 
Computers 144 8.6% 
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Table 4 
Correlations among dependent variables 
Sample correlations among key dependent variables.  The top panel shows Pearson correlations for the 
entire sample of 4,451 debt contracts, and the bottom panel shows correlations for the subsample of 1,236 
performance sensitive debt (PSD) contracts.  Data are drawn from the intersection of observations in the 
Dealscan, Compustat, and ExecuComp databases between 1994 and 2002, from all industries except the 
financial industry (SIC 6000-6999).   The slope and convexity of the PSD loan pricing schedules are 
based on changes in interest spreads for different rating intervals, as described more completely in the text.  
 
All observations 
 
Average slope 
 
Local slope 
 
Overall convexity 
Local slope 0.823***   
Overall convexity 0.488*** 0.487***  
Local convexity 0.068*** -0.038** 0.183*** 
 
 
PSD observations 
 
Average slope 
 
Local slope 
 
Overall convexity 
Local slope 0.526***   
Overall convexity -0.174*** -0.029  
Local convexity -0.001 -0.153*** 0.173*** 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels 
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Table 5 
Slopes of PSD contracts and CEOs’ equity incentives 
Regression models for slopes of PSD contract pricing schedules.  The sample includes 4,451 debt 
contracts issued by 1,359 firms between 1994 and 2002, both with and without PSD contract features.  
The average slope of a pricing schedule equals the mean of the ratio of the differential interest cost over 
each credit rating interval covered by a PSD contract, divided by the differential Moody’s value-weighted 
average interest cost over the same interval at the time of the contract negotiation.  Local slope is the 
average slope measured over the two rating intervals immediately adjacent to the firm’s rating; if 
performance pricing is defined only in one direction, local slope is calculated only for the single adjacent 
interval.  The slope of straight debt is zero.  For columns 3 and 4, the average slope dependent variable, 
which is defined more completely in the text, is decomposed into two segments.  In the third column, the 
dependent variable equals the average slope at all credit ratings below the firm’s rating at the time of 
contract inception (the “interest increasing” range), and zero at all higher ratings.  In the fourth column, 
the dependent variable equals the average slope at all credit ratings above the firm’s current rating (the 
“interest decreasing” range) and zero otherwise.  Key explanatory variables are the sensitivity of CEO 
stock and option values to stock price (delta), and the sensitivity of CEO option values to stock price 
volatility (vega).  Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  Estimates use a 
two-stage least squares Tobit framework described more fully in the text. 
 
Dependent variable: Average slope  x 102 
Local slope  
x 102 
Slope of interest 
increasing 
segment x 102 
Slope of interest 
decreasing 
segment x 102 
Delta -217.224 -161.355 -228.140 -76.813 
 (85.375)** (125.331) (79.623)*** (83.395) 
Log (1+vega) 1.026 1.216 0.887 0.461 
 (0.565)* (0.711)* (0.521)* (0.544) 
Firm size (log of assets) -3.976 -4.221 -4.760 -2.784 
 (1.166)*** (1.498)*** (1.090)*** (1.104)** 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) -33.398 -46.703 -36.708 -27.229 
 (7.159)*** (10.015)*** (7.147)*** (6.949)*** 
Market-to-book ratio -0.711 0.138 -0.172 -1.979 
 (0.869) (1.121) (0.841) (0.967)** 
EBITDA / total assets 27.146 30.641 25.737 26.155 
 (10.355)*** (12.998)** (10.176)** (9.241)*** 
EBITDA time series volatility -0.023 -0.020 -0.002 -0.023 
 (0.071) (0.094) (0.055) (0.065) 
Sr. debt rated by S&P or Moody’s 31.988 39.818 172.140 22.644 
(indicator) (3.284)*** (4.582)*** (9.386)*** (3.222)*** 
Loan amount / total assets 0.186 0.348 -0.0145 -0.090 
 (0.979) (1.347) (0.824) (0.768) 
Log of Maturity (months) 0.281 0.498 0.238 0.409 
 (0.955) (1.211) (0.898) (0.893) 
Log of Number of PSD contracts 38.677 47.062 34.778 31.436 
 (1.778)*** (2.803)*** (1.725)*** (2.064)*** 
     
Year & 2-digit SIC indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.445 0.461 0.478 0.470 
Observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 6 
Global and local convexity of PSD contracts 
Two-stage least squares regression estimates of the global and local convexity of pricing schedules of 
performance sensitive debt contracts.  The sample includes 4,451 debt contracts issued by 1,359 firms 
between 1994 and 2002, both with and without PSD contract features.  Convexity is calculated based on 
the most extreme departure of the pricing schedule slope from the linear projection of the schedule 
between the upper and lower limits of credit ratings for which performance pricing is contracted.  
Concave pricing schedules, about eight percent of the sample, are assigned negative values for convexity.  
Global convexity is measured over the entire range of credit ratings for which performance pricing is 
specified, while local convexity is measured over the two rating intervals immediately adjacent to the 
firm’s rating; if performance pricing is defined only in one direction, local convexity is calculated only 
for the single adjacent interval.  For non-PSD (straight) debt, the majority of the sample, convexity 
always equals zero by construction.  Key explanatory variables are the sensitivity of CEO stock and 
option values to stock price (delta), and the sensitivity of CEO option values to stock price volatility 
(vega).  Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Global convexity x 102 Local convexity x 102 
Delta -43.078 -59.480 
 (22.991)* (25.713)** 
Log (1+vega) 0.267 0.060 
 (0.144)* (0.151) 
Firm size (log of assets) -0.606 -0.096 
 (0.336)* (0.390) 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) -7.731 -3.626 
 (1.435)*** (1.484)** 
Market-to-book ratio 0.350 0.078 
 (0.162)** (0.188) 
EBITDA / total assets -1.505 0.812 
 (1.416) (1.146) 
EBITDA time series volatility -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Sr. debt rated by S&P or Moody’s (indicator) 3.428 1.349 
 (0.577)*** (0.637)** 
Loan amount / total assets 0.161 0.110 
 (0.317) (0.190) 
Log of Maturity (months) 0.442 0.205 
 (0.242)* (0.236) 
Log of Number of PSD contracts / firm 6.342 6.188 
 (0.540)*** (0.770)*** 
   
Year & 2-digit SIC indicators Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.144 
Observations 4,451 4,451 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 7 
The impact of corporate governance on PSD slopes 
Regression models for slopes of PSD contract pricing schedules.  The sample includes 4,451 debt 
contracts issued by 1,359 firms between 1994 and 2002, both with and without PSD contract features.  
The average slope of the pricing schedule equals the mean of the ratio of the differential interest cost over 
each credit rating interval covered by a PSD contract, divided by the differential Moody’s value-weighted 
average interest cost over the same interval at the time of contract negotiation.  Local slope is the average 
slope measured over the two rating intervals immediately adjacent to the firm’s rating; if performance 
pricing is defined only in one direction, local slope is calculated only for the single adjacent interval.  The 
slope of straight debt is zero.  For columns 3 and 4, the average slope dependent variable, which is 
defined more completely in the text, is decomposed into two segments.  In the third column, the 
dependent variable equals the average slope at all credit ratings below the firm’s rating at the time of 
contract inception (the “interest increasing” range), and zero at all higher ratings.  In the fourth column, 
the dependent variable equals the average slope at all credit ratings above the firm’s current rating (the 
“interest decreasing” range) and zero otherwise.  Key explanatory variables are the indicator for poison 
pill, sensitivity of CEO stock and option values to stock price (delta), and the sensitivity of CEO option 
values to stock price volatility (vega).  Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. 
Estimates use a two stage least squares Tobit framework described more fully in the text. Estimates use a 
two-stage least squares Tobit framework described more fully in the text. 
Dependent variable: Average slope  x 102 
Local slope  
x 102 
Slope of interest 
increasing 
segment x 102 
Slope of interest 
decreasing 
segment x 102 
Poison pill (indicator) 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.003)** (0.004)* (0.003)* (0.003)** 
Delta -212.286 -156.462 -223.895 -71.781 
 (84.706)** (124.751) (79.643)*** (82.627) 
Log (1+vega) 1.002 1.193 0.860 0.439 
 (0.560)* (0.708)* (0.518)* (0.540) 
Firm size (log of assets) -3.902 -4.146 -4.693 -2.717 
 (1.159)*** (1.492)*** (1.089)*** (1.095)** 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) -33.036 -46.365 -36.359 -26.922 
 (7.120)*** (9.981)*** (7.113)*** (6.904)*** 
Market-to-book ratio -0.673 0.176 -0.149 -1.946 
 (0.862) (1.116) (0.839) (0.956)** 
EBITDA / total assets 26.165 29.829 24.905 25.335 
 (10.038)*** (12.756)** (9.940)** (8.974)*** 
EBITDA time series volatility -0.023 -0.020 -0.003 -0.024 
 (0.071) (0.094) (0.055) (0.065) 
Sr. debt rated by S&P or Moody’s 32.034 39.902 171.716 22.718 
(indicator) (3.270)*** (4.576)*** (9.382)*** (3.213)*** 
Loan amount / total assets 0.203 0.367 -0.003 -0.070 
 (0.977) (1.346) (0.823) (0.768) 
Log of Maturity (months) 0.291 0.512 0.266 0.416 
 (0.952) (1.208) (0.897) (0.892) 
Log of Number of PSD contracts 38.737 47.133 34.833 31.508 
 (1.778)*** (2.799)*** (1.736)*** (2.059)*** 
Year & 2-digit SIC indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.445 0.461 0.479 0.470 
Observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Figure 1 
PSD issuance frequencies and large CEO stock option awards 
The figure shows performance sensitive debt issuance frequencies for subsamples partitioned according to 
whether the company’s prior debt issue in the Dealscan database was PSD or straight debt.  Within each 
subsample, PSD frequencies are shown separately based on whether the CEO received a large stock 
option award between the prior and subsequent debt issues, with a large option award defined as greater 
than 1.0% of shares outstanding.  The overall sample includes 248 observations associated with large 
CEO option awards, and 4,203 observations with no large awards.  In both subsamples, the difference 
between the two bars shown is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure 2 
Value of equity claim under different capital structures 
The figure shows the value of an equity claim under three different stylized capital structures for a 
hypothetical firm.  In all three cases, the equity claim has an identical ex ante dollar value.  The solid grey 
line shows that under an unlevered, all-equity capital structure, the equity holder receives a constant 
fraction of future firm value.  The dotted line shows the future value of equity under a classical levered 
capital structure in which the firm issues straight debt and uses the proceeds to eliminate equity held by 
other investors.  With straight debt, if the firm performs poorly, equity receives nothing, but when the 
firm performs well the equity holder receives a greater fraction of firm value than she would in an all-
equity firm, as the slope of the dotted line exceeds the slope of the solid grey line.  The dark, segmented 
line shows the future value of equity under a levered capital structure in which the firm issues 
performance sensitive debt and uses the proceeds to eliminate outside equity.  With PSD, the cost of debt 
rises as firm performance deteriorates, and default occurs at a higher firm value.  The different segments 
of the PSD schedule reflect periodic increases in interest cost as firm performance deteriorates; these 
higher interest costs reduce the value of the equity claim.  At very high levels of performance, the value 
of an equity claim exceeds the value that would be realized in an ordinary levered capital structure 
without PSD.  
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(3a) Optimal PSD vs. CEO shares owned  
 
 
(3b) Optimal PSD vs. CEO options held 
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(3c) Optimal PSD vs. bankruptcy cost 
 
 
(3d) Optimal PSD vs. CEO risk aversion 
 
Figures 3a through 3d 
Comparative statics of PSD slope 
The figures show the optimal intercept (c0) and slope (c1) of a PSD contract with respect to the 
CEO’s stock ownership (3a), stock option holdings (3b), the firm’s fractional bankruptcy cost 
(3c), and the CEO’s risk-aversion parameter (3d).  The figures are generated by numerical 
simulations based upon the model described in section II.  Simulations use the following 
assumptions: CEO equity holdings (n) of 5 million shares, CEO option holdings (m) of 10 
million shares, total outstanding number of shares (N) of 5 billion, CEO initial wealth (w0) of $50 
million, option strike price of $1, risk free rate of 1.57%, fractional bankruptcy cost (γ) of 10%, 
and coefficient of risk-aversion (ρ) of 2.   
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Figure 4 
Examples of performance pricing grids 
The figure shows examples of pricing grids in performance sensitive debt contracts negotiated by Nortel 
Networks Inc., according to data from Loan Pricing Corp.’s Dealscan database.  The solid line with 
circles shows interest rates for a 364-day credit facility negotiated on July 31, 2001, contingent upon the 
company’s future credit rating.  The dashed line shows the pricing schedule for similar loans to the same 
company on December 20, 2001, and April 8, 2002.  Nortel’s S&P senior debt rating was A on July 31, 
2001, BBB- on December 20, 2001, and NR on April 8, 2002. 
200 
Rating on date of contract 3  
(April 8, 2002) 
Rating on date of contract 2 
(December 20, 2001) 150 
Interest spread 
over LIBOR 
(basis points) 
100 
Rating on date of contract 1  
(July 31, 2001) 50 
Contract 1
Contracts 2 & 3
0 
AA-NR BB BBB- BBB+ A 
Credit rating 
 52
 
  
Figure 5 
Slope and convexity of a performance pricing profile 
The figure shows a hypothetical performance pricing profile for a firm that has credit rating i and 
negotiates a performance sensitive debt contract calling for higher interest payments if the credit rating 
deteriorates and lower interest payments if it improves.  The figure shows how the interest rate might 
change above and below the firm’s current rating.  If i – 1 and i + 1 represent the credit ratings 
immediately adjacent to current rating, then our definition of local slope is: 
 
 
 
 
Where Spread(n) is the interest charged at credit rating n, measured as basis points above LIBOR, and 
Moody(n) is the value-weighted average yield for long-term corporate bonds of credit rating n during the 
month in which the contract is negotiated.  Our definition of average slope is analogous, except it is 
measured using the mean ratios for all rating segments between the upper and lower limits of credit 
ratings specified in each contract.  Our definition of overall convexity, which is described more fully in 
the text, is based upon the maximum deviation of a pricing profile from linearity and is therefore similar 
to the ratio: 
 
 
 
 
Convexity therefore equals zero for perfectly linear pricing schedules and takes a negative value for 
concave schedules. 
  
i i +1 i -1 
Credit rating 
Interest rate 
Performance pricing schedule 
B 
A 
D 
C 
Linear interpolation 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+
−++−−
−−
)()1(
)()1(
)1()(
)1()(
2
1
iMoodyiMoody
iSpreadiSpread
iMoodyiMoody
iSpreadiSpread
DC
BA
−
−
 53
 
Figure 6 
Credit quality of PSD and straight debt issuers 
The figure shows the frequency distribution of senior debt ratings at the time of contract 
inception for samples of 1,303 performance sensitive debt contracts and 2,666 straight debt 
contracts.  The PSD and straight debt samples analyzed in the paper are somewhat larger, but the 
figure does not include debt issues by companies that are not rated by S&P or Moody’s. 
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